We present the design of a banner advertising auction which is considerably more expressive than current designs. We describe a general model of expressive ad contracts/bidding an...
Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm,...
We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items in unlimited supply. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [8, 4] th...
In this paper, we are interested in the relationship between final prices of online auctions and possible shill activities during those auctions. We conduct experiments on real auc...
Online auction has become an intriguing new type of economic exchange mechanism. Given that Internet auctions differ from traditional physical auctions in terms of flexibility and...
We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapte...