Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
With the growth of electronic markets, designing double auction mechanisms that are applicable to emerging market structures has become an important research topic. In this paper,...
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Abstract. We describe Scusi?, a multi-stage, spoken language interpretation mechanism designed to be part of a robot-mounted dialogue system. Scusi?’s interpretation process maps...
Abstract. System area networks (SANs) need to support low-fanout multicasts efficiently in addition to broadcasts and unicasts. A critical component in SANs is the switch, which i...
Rajendra V. Boppana, Rajesh Boppana, Suresh Chalas...