We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The “clock phase” functions as a trust...
David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Tho...
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. W...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Combinatorial Auctions (CAs), where users bid on combination of items, have emerged as a useful tool for resource allocation in distributed systems. However, two main difficulties...