Sciweavers

107 search results - page 11 / 22
» Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions
Sort
View
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments
Abstract. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items....
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
INTERFACES
2008
128views more  INTERFACES 2008»
13 years 8 months ago
Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf
re more abstract than necessary. They depend on assumptions that are highly unlikely to occur in practical situations, which are often less formal and rigid. Nonetheless, we discus...
Ronald M. Harstad, Aleksandar Sasa Pekec
WSC
2008
13 years 10 months ago
Randomized methods for solving the Winner Determination Problem in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...
Joshua C. C. Chan, Dirk P. Kroese
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Agents Preferences in Decentralized Task Allocation
The ability to express preferences for specific tasks in multi-agent auctions is an important element for potential users who are considering to use such auctioning systems. This p...
Mark Hoogendoorn, Maria L. Gini
WECWIS
2002
IEEE
129views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2002»
14 years 1 months ago
On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
Despite the large amounts of runtime needed to adequately solve a combinatorial auction (CA), existing iterative CA auction protocols require winner determination during every rou...
Ryan Kastner, Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, ...