We present the design and analysis of the first fully expressive, iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language (TBBL) that is co...
Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, S&...
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that l...
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
We present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The method is well suited to the natural information and control structure of moder...