Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive ...
David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Ad...
Externalities are recognized to exist in the sponsored search market, where two co-located ads compete for user attention. Existing work focuses on the effect of another ad on th...
While many real-world combinatorial problems can be advantageously modeled and solved using Constraint Programming, scalability remains a major issue in practice. Constraint models...
Kenneth M. Bayer, Martin Michalowski, Berthe Y. Ch...
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...