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» Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions
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AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 8 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
90views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive ...
David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Ad...
AAAI
2011
12 years 8 months ago
On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions
Externalities are recognized to exist in the sponsored search market, where two co-located ads compete for user attention. Existing work focuses on the effect of another ad on th...
Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang,...
CP
2007
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
Reformulating CSPs for Scalability with Application to Geospatial Reasoning
While many real-world combinatorial problems can be advantageously modeled and solved using Constraint Programming, scalability remains a major issue in practice. Constraint models...
Kenneth M. Bayer, Martin Michalowski, Berthe Y. Ch...
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi