Recent algorithms provide powerful solutions to the problem of determining cost-minimizing (or revenue-maximizing) allocations of items in combinatorial auctions. However, in many...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
We present a novel algorithm for computing the optimal winning bids in a combinatorial auction (CA), that is, an auction in which bidders bid for bundles of goods. All previously ...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
We present a solution to the winner determination problem which takes into account not only costs but also risk aversion of the agent that accepts the bids, and which works for au...
Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behav...
Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes...