This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
In this paper, we study the class of competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general (non-quasilinear) utility functions. Mechanism design in general non-quasili...
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
Abstract. We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibili...
Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. ...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...