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» Characterizing Truthful Market Design
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WINE
2010
Springer
144views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market Makers
Abstract. Most existing market maker mechanisms for prediction markets are designed for events with a finite number of outcomes. All known attempts on designing market makers for f...
Xi Alice Gao, Yiling Chen
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Enrico Gerdi...
WINE
2009
Springer
121views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets
We study the strategic behavior of risk-neutral non-myopic agents in Dynamic Parimutuel Markets (DPM). In a DPM, agents buy or sell shares of contracts, whose future payoff in a p...
Qianya Lin, Yiling Chen
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
122views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes