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» Characterizing Truthful Market Design
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ICALP
2004
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
The Power of Verification for One-Parameter Agents
We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better ...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
WWW
2009
ACM
14 years 9 months ago
General auction mechanism for search advertising
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the pag...
Dávid Pál, Gagan Aggarwal, Martin P&...
DSS
2006
104views more  DSS 2006»
13 years 8 months ago
Supply chain information sharing in a macro prediction market
This paper aims to address supply chain partners' incentives for information sharing from an information systems design perspective. Specifically, we consider a supply chain ...
Zhiling Guo, Fang Fang, Andrew B. Whinston
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Decision rules and decision markets
We explore settings where a principal must make a decision about which action to take to achieve a desired outcome. The principal elicits the probability of achieving the outcome ...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm
ACMICEC
2006
ACM
111views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2006»
14 years 9 days ago
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments
Consider an open infrastructure in which anyone can deploy mechanisms to support automated decision making and coordination amongst self-interested computational agents. Strategyp...
Laura Kang, David C. Parkes