4 search results - page 1 / 1 » Characterizing Truthful Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms |
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2008
Springer
Publication
In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are cur-
rently extensively used by search engines, the auction for
a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k)
c...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 3 months ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...