31 search results - page 1 / 7 » Characterizing truthfulness in discrete domains |
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2008
ACM
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
ESA
2008
Springer
14 years 19 days ago
2008
Springer
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...