In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such ga...
Fair allocation of payoffs among cooperating players who can form various coalitions of differing utilities is the classic game theoretic “coalition problem.” Shapley’s va...
Three service providers in competition, try to optimize their quality of service / content level and their service access price. But, they have to deal with uncertainty on the cons...
A. Falappa, an Abstract Dialogue Framework Guillermo R. Simari Regular Helena Kein¨anen An Algorithm for Generating Nash Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games 15:30-16:00 A...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...