We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items in unlimited supply. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [8, 4] th...
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentia...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Enrico Gerdi...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these ent...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter McBurn...