Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
We consider the problem of resource allocation and scheduling where information and decisions are decentralized, and our goal is to propose a market mechanism that allows resource...
In this paper we formulate a combinatorial auction brokering problem as a set packing problem and apply a simulated annealing heuristic with hybrid local moves to solve the proble...
We develop a novel bidding strategy that software agents can use to buy and sell goods in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy involves the agent forming a bid or ask by...
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Rajdeep K. Dash, Esther D...
This paper describes the uses and architecture of a network-centered computing-rich software platform called PowerWeb. PowerWeb was designed and built as a simulation environment ...
Ray Zimmerman, Robert J. Thomas, Deqiang Gan, Carl...