We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Kar...
Many e-services are time-sensitive as the users request them for a specific time period. Such services need to be repeatedly offered to keep them constantly utilized. This paper s...
We introduce the following consensus estimate problem. Several processors hold private and possibly different lower bounds on a value. The processors do not communicate with each ...
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...