Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unkn...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,...
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to specific instances of a decision scenario...
This paper attends to the problem of a mechanism designer seeking to influence the outcome of a strategic game based on her creditability. The mechanism designer offers additional...
Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schm...
In classical mechanism design setting the outcome of the mechanism is computed by a trusted central party. In this paper we consider distributed implementations in which the outco...