In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the ...
Abstract. We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that e...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Grant Schoenebeck, Gregor...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a public project. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non...
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
We study adaptive routing algorithms in a round-based model. Suppose we are given a network equipped with load-dependent latency functions on the edges and a set of commodities eac...