We investigate asymptotically optimal keyword auctions, that is, auctions which maximize revenue as the number of bidders grows. We do so under two alternative behavioral assumpti...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efïŹcient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the biddersâ...
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a sellerâs trust or reliability. In this paper, we ...
Guruprasad Airy, Po-Chun Chen, Tracy Mullen, John ...
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...