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ACMICEC
2007
ACM
220views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2007»
14 years 2 months ago
Asymptotically optimal repeated auctions for sponsored search
We investigate asymptotically optimal keyword auctions, that is, auctions which maximize revenue as the number of bidders grows. We do so under two alternative behavioral assumpti...
Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 4 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efïŹcient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the biddersâ...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
AAAI
2010
14 years 10 days ago
Stability and Incentive Compatibility in a Kernel-Based Combinatorial Auction
We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information fr...
Sébastien Lahaie
IAT
2009
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
Incorporating Trust into Combinatorial Auctions: What Does Trust Cost?
As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller’s trust or reliability. In this paper, we ...
Guruprasad Airy, Po-Chun Chen, Tracy Mullen, John ...
ATAL
2004
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm