Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a protocol. In this paper, we show that computational proofs of indistinguishabili...
We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventiona...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Bogdan...
Abstract. We deļ¬ne a framework to reason about implementations of equational theories in the presence of an adaptive adversary. We particularly focus on soundess of static equiva...
Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbi...
Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (STOC 2000) introduced the notion of resettable zeroknowledge proofs, where the protocol must be zero-knowledge even if a cheating veriļ...