233 search results - page 2 / 47 » Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms |
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2005
IEEE
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ï¬...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2008
Springer
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common econom...
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
s...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...