233 search results - page 3 / 47 » Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms |
Publication
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for
assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p)
with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...
HICSS
2007
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2007
IEEE
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
PODC
2004
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2004
ACM
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
AAAI
2010
13 years 9 months ago
2010
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...