233 search results - page 4 / 47 » Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms |
AAAI
2004
13 years 8 months ago
2004
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
APPROX
2004
Springer
14 years 26 days ago
2004
Springer
In many economic settings, convex figures on the plane are for sale. For example, one might want to sell advertising space on a newspaper page. Selfish agents must be motivated ...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
14 years 8 days ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2005
ACM
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally ...