233 search results - page 5 / 47 » Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms |
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
14 years 26 days ago
2004
ACM
We consider the problem of a spatially distributed market with strategic agents. A single good is traded in a set of independent markets, where shipment between markets is possibl...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2009
ACM
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
WCNC
2008
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2008
IEEE
—In this paper, we study the election of multiple leaders for intrusion detection in the presence of selfish nodes in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). To balance the resource co...
SOCIALCOM
2010
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Abstract--In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic mechanism to encourage truthful data sharing for distributed data mining. Our proposed mechanism uses the classic VickreyClarke...
AIR
2004
13 years 7 months ago
2004
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...