We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend ...
— Separable games are a structured subclass of continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form; the zero-sum case has been studied in earlier work. Included in this su...
Noah D. Stein, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parril...
Can learning algorithms find a Nash equilibrium? This is a natural question for several reasons. Learning algorithms resemble the behavior of players in many naturally arising gam...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christo...
We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version)