We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to “compact” representati...
Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin L...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
Can learning algorithms find a Nash equilibrium? This is a natural question for several reasons. Learning algorithms resemble the behavior of players in many naturally arising gam...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christo...
We describe algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in structured game representations, including both graphical games and multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The algorithms...