In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the adversary/follower) before the advers...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
Primary user emulation attack in multichannel cognitive radio systems is discussed. An attacker is assumed to be able to send primary-user-like signals during spectrum sensing peri...
Given a zero-sum infinite game we examine the question if players have optimal memoryless deterministic strategies. It turns out that under some general conditions the problem for...
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning ...
Making commitments, e.g., through promises and threats, enables a player to exploit the strengths of his own strategic position as well as the weaknesses of that of his opponents....