We present a general methodology to automate the search for equilibrium strategies in games derived from computational experimentation. Our approach interleaves empirical game-the...
We consider a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game where two independent learning agents play against each other. We assume that the players can observe each others’ action but ar...
Abstract. Most of multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms aim to converge to a Nash equilibrium, but a Nash equilibrium does not necessarily mean a desirable result. On the o...
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning ...
In this paper, we investigate Reinforcement learning (RL) in multi-agent systems (MAS) from an evolutionary dynamical perspective. Typical for a MAS is that the environment is not ...
Karl Tuyls, Pieter Jan't Hoen, Bram Vanschoenwinke...