Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where n selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed...
Abstract. We study a general class of non-cooperative games coming from combinatorial covering and facility location problems. A game for k players is based on an integer programmi...
Abstract. We study Facility Location games played by n agents situated on the nodes of a graph. Each agent orders installation of a facility at a node of the graph and pays connect...
We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Ter...