Abstract. We study the fundamental problem of computing an arbitrary Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games. We start by proposing a novel characterization of the set of Nash equilibri...
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
We provide efficient algorithms for finding approximate BayesNash equilibria (BNE) in graphical, specifically tree, games of incomplete information. In such games an agent’s p...
Satinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman
Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific independence between players' utility functi...
Agents engaged in noncooperative interaction may seek to achieve a Nash equilibrium; this requires that agents be aware of others’ rewards. Misinformation about rewards leads to...