The physical implementation of cryptographic algorithms may leak to some attacker security information by the side channel data, as power consumption, timing, temperature or elect...
Daniel Mesquita, Jean-Denis Techer, Lionel Torres,...
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Se...
We define and study a distributed cryptographic implementation for an asynchronous pi calculus. At the source level, we adapt simple type systems designed for establishing formal ...
for reasoning about abstract models of protocols. The work on informal methods attempts to discern common patterns in the extensive record of flawed protocols, and to formulate po...
Contextual equivalences for cryptographic process calculi, like the spi-calculus, can be used to reason about correctness of protocols, but their definition suffers from quantific...
Michele Boreale, Rocco De Nicola, Rosario Pugliese