Noninterference is typically used as a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information manipulated by a program. In contrast to static checking of noni...
Abstract. We study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of passive and adaptive adversaries. We first describe the seminal resul...
Abstract Non-interference is typically used as a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information manipulated by a program. In contrast to static checkin...
Gurvan Le Guernic, Anindya Banerjee, Thomas P. Jen...
We present a new mechanized prover for showing correspondence assertions for cryptographic protocols in the computational model. Correspondence assertions are useful in particular...
We consider expansions of the Abadi-Rogaway logic of indistinguishability of formal cryptographic expressions. We expand the logic in order to cover cases when partial information...