The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as qualit...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Enrico Gerdi...
In addition to useful Economic interpretation, auction based algorithms are generally found to be efficient. In this note, we observe that the auction-based mechanism can also be u...
Abstract. Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing com...