Ping-pong protocols with recursive definitions of agents, but without any active intruder, are a Turing powerful model. We show that under the environment sensitive semantics (i.e....
—Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing results focus on trace properties like secrecy (expressed as a reachability pr...
We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-call...
Abstract. We consider two standard notions in formal security protocol analysis: message deducibility and static equivalence under equational theories. We present polynomial-time a...
We study the verification of compositions of Web Service peers which interact asynchronously by exchanging messages. Each peer has access to a local database and reacts to user in...
Alin Deutsch, Liying Sui, Victor Vianu, Dayou Zhou