We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Speci...
Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennen...
We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private pre...
Abstract. In this paper we present a cooperative game theoretic interpretation of the shortest path problem. We consider a buying agent who has a budget to go from a specified sou...
In this paper, we study a service procurement problem with uncertainty as to whether service providers are capable of completing a given task within a specified deadline. This typ...
Enrico Gerding, Sebastian Stein, Kate Larson, Alex...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...