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AI
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Fault tolerant mechanism design
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Speci...
Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennen...
JSAC
2006
99views more  JSAC 2006»
13 years 7 months ago
Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private pre...
Costas Courcoubetis, Richard R. Weber
WINE
2005
Springer
143views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
Economic Mechanisms for Shortest Path Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information
Abstract. In this paper we present a cooperative game theoretic interpretation of the shortest path problem. We consider a buying agent who has a budget to go from a specified sou...
T. S. Chandrashekar, Yadati Narahari
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Scalable mechanism design for the procurement of services with uncertain durations
In this paper, we study a service procurement problem with uncertainty as to whether service providers are capable of completing a given task within a specified deadline. This typ...
Enrico Gerding, Sebastian Stein, Kate Larson, Alex...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
152views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan