107 search results - page 7 / 22 » Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Pr... |
FOCS
2008
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
2008
IEEE
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
ATAL
2004
Springer
14 years 29 days ago
2004
Springer
We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterpar...
AMMA
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2009
Springer
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2009
IEEE
We consider a problem where two selfish cognitive radio users try to share two channels on which they each have potentially different valuations. We first formulate the problem as ...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...