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EOR
2008
112views more  EOR 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
DEA based auctions
We discuss the design of multi-dimensional tender and auction mechanisms that combine Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and auction theory. The mechanisms select an agent to perform...
Peter Bogetoft, Kurt Nielsen
AAAI
2004
13 years 9 months ago
Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
161views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
14 years 11 days ago
Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects
The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem s an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collect...
Dave Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer
ISAAC
2009
Springer
114views Algorithms» more  ISAAC 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Good Programming in Transactional Memory
Abstract. In a multicore transactional memory (TM) system, concurrent execution threads interact and interfere with each other through shared memory. The less interference a progra...
Raphael Eidenbenz, Roger Wattenhofer
CORR
2010
Springer
136views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
On Optimal Single-Item Auctions
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos