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» Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents
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ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier
IAT
2008
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Mak...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
107views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 24 days ago
Using value queries in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
AMET
1998
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Bidding Strategies for Trading Agents in Auction-Based Tournaments
Abstract. Auction-based electronic commerce is an increasingly interesting domain for AI researchers. In this paper we present an attempt towards the construction of trading agents...
Pere Garcia, Eduardo Giménez, Lluis Godo, J...
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 28 days ago
A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations
Abstract. This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agen...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings