In this paper, we consider the design of an agent that is able to autonomously make optimal bundling decisions when selling multiple heterogeneous items within existing online auc...
Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jenn...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Enrico Gerdi...
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...