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» Designing differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms
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CORR
2010
Springer
189views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
An Optimal Dynamic Mechanism for Multi-Armed Bandit Processes
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
Sham M. Kakade, Ilan Lobel, Hamid Nazerzadeh
AAAI
2008
13 years 12 months ago
An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising
We propose an expressive auction design that allows advertisers to specify the kinds of demographics and websites they wish to target within an advertising network. The design all...
Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, David M....
JSAC
2006
95views more  JSAC 2006»
13 years 9 months ago
Design differentiated service multicast with selfish agents
Differentiated service (DiffServ) is a mechanism to provide the Quality of Service (QoS) with a certain performance guarantee. In this paper, we study how to design DiffServ multic...
Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li, Zheng Sun
FC
2004
Springer
105views Cryptology» more  FC 2004»
14 years 3 months ago
Secure Generalized Vickrey Auction without Third-party Servers
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Com...
Makoto Yokoo, Koutarou Suzuki
WINE
2005
Springer
161views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 3 months ago
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari