We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...
When users click on poor quality advertisements, there is a hidden cost to the search engine due to the user dissatisfaction (for instance, users are less likely to click on ads in...
: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. W...
Abstract Privacy has become a factor of increasing importance in auction design. We propose general techniques for cryptographic first-price and (M + 1)st-price auction protocols t...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a broad class of re...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...