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» Designing the perfect auction
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WINE
2007
Springer
120views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
14 years 4 months ago
False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahy...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
144views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
14 years 3 months ago
Security model for a multi-agent marketplace
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...
Ashutosh Jaiswal, Yongdae Kim, Maria L. Gini
MOBIHOC
2010
ACM
13 years 7 months ago
Breaking bidder collusion in large-scale spectrum auctions
Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to provide spectrum on-demand to many small wireless networks. As the number of participants grows, bidder collusion becomes a se...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
SODA
2012
ACM
200views Algorithms» more  SODA 2012»
12 years 8 days ago
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to e...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin