In this paper, we consider the design of an agent that is able to autonomously make optimal bundling decisions when selling multiple heterogeneous items within existing online auc...
Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jenn...
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
— We study how to improve sequential single-item auctions that assign targets to robots for exploration tasks such as environmental clean-up, space-exploration, and search and re...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...