Sciweavers

628 search results - page 33 / 126
» Designing the perfect auction
Sort
View
CHI
2001
ACM
14 years 10 months ago
Ignoring perfect knowledge in-the-world for imperfect knowledge in-the-head
Constraints and dependencies among the elements of embodied cognition form patterns or microstrategies of interactive behavior. Hard constraints determine which microstrategies ar...
Wayne D. Gray, Wai-Tat Fu
COGSCI
2004
81views more  COGSCI 2004»
13 years 9 months ago
Soft constraints in interactive behavior: the case of ignoring perfect knowledge in-the-world for imperfect knowledge in-the-hea
Constraints and dependencies among the elements of embodied cognition form patterns or microstrategies of interactive behavior. Hard constraints determine which microstrategies ar...
Wayne D. Gray, Wai-Tat Fu
CORR
2008
Springer
83views Education» more  CORR 2008»
13 years 10 months ago
Code diversity in multiple antenna wireless communication
The standard approach to the design of individual space
Yiyue Wu, A. Robert Calderbank
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ï¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
CORR
2010
Springer
128views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 7 months ago
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg