This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...
Recent attention on correlated multi-input multi-output systems has centered around the case of imperfect channel or statistical information at the transmitter. The focus of this ...
Vasanthan Raghavan, Ada S. Y. Poon, Venugopal V. V...
We consider the problem of resource allocation and scheduling where information and decisions are decentralized, and our goal is to propose a market mechanism that allows resource...
Auctions are promising decentralized methods for teams of agents to allocate and re-allocate tasks among themselves in dynamic, partially known and time-constrained domains with p...
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...