Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
I develop a new mechanism for risk allocation and information speculation called a dynamic pari-mutuel market (DPM). A DPM acts as hybrid between a pari-mutuel market and a contin...
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
Making commitments, e.g., through promises and threats, enables a player to exploit the strengths of his own strategic position as well as the weaknesses of that of his opponents....
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...