143 search results - page 11 / 29 » Economic mechanism design for securing online auctions |
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common econom...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
2005
ACM
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
ATAL
2004
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2004
Springer
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
WINE
2005
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2005
Springer
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
STOC
2003
ACM
14 years 9 months ago
2003
ACM
We describe a general technique for converting an online algorithm B to a truthtelling mechanism. We require that the original online competitive algorithm has certain "nicen...