This paper describes simulations designed to test the relative efficiency of two different sequential auction mechanisms for allocating compute resources between users in a shared...
Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unkn...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,...
Agent based online auctions have not yet become popular because they are not trustable. One of the major concerns in agent based online auctions is the shilling behavior problem, w...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Enrico Gerdi...
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...