We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...