Sciweavers

143 search results - page 5 / 29
» Economic mechanism design for securing online auctions
Sort
View
WINE
2010
Springer
168views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 6 months ago
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
Elias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
93views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 2 months ago
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2006
Springer
14 years 12 days ago
Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...
AAAI
2004
13 years 10 months ago
Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...
Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
97views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2003»
14 years 1 months ago
Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm