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» Economic mechanism design for securing online auctions
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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
110views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 1 months ago
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation
We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of...
Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer
ITNG
2008
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
A Framework for Agent-Based Trust Management in Online Auctions
Current electronic commerce applications such as online auction systems are not trustworthy due to a lack of effective trust management mechanisms. A trustworthy online auction sy...
Haiping Xu, Sol M. Shatz, Christopher K. Bates
AIPS
2003
13 years 10 months ago
Economically Augmented Job Shop Scheduling
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...
Wolfram Conen
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
144views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
14 years 1 months ago
Security model for a multi-agent marketplace
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...
Ashutosh Jaiswal, Yongdae Kim, Maria L. Gini